Shanghai 2025: manufacturers becoming brands and why the future of the bike industry starts now

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The 2025 edition of the Shanghai Bicycle Show wasn’t just a trade fair. It was a wake-up call. We discussed how important this Shanghai 2025 show has been in our previous blog article you can find here.

A new industrial era rises from Shanghai

Let's now go deeper across numerous colossal halls, to understand why this show didn't just present new products, but revealed a tectonic shift in the global balance of power in the bike industry. While huge companies like Giant and KMC were present, the show was dominated by hundreds of Chinese brands, many unknown in the West but crystal clear in their purpose: to stop being OEM suppliers and start being global brands. Forget the old image of "cheap copies" and outsourced labor. What we saw in Shanghai is something else entirely: mature manufacturing, fast innovation, and brutal efficiency. China is no longer just the factory of the bicycle world. It is becoming the launchpad where emerging brands are born, developed, and readied for being launched in the global market.

In the next sections, we’ll take a detailed look at some of the most exciting innovations unveiled in Shanghai, before diving into a broader strategic reflection on what these trends reveal about the evolving future of the global bike industry.

Innovation and speed: highlights from the Shanghai 2025 Bicylce Show

The show offered a full spectrum of innovations, but three themes stood out: materials, components, and ambition.

Wheels of the Future

DSK - One-piece carbon wheels: 1300g for a road pair, $600 retail, made from T-1000/T800 carbon. Hooked/hookless hybrid lips and beefed-up hubs promise lateral stiffness and high-end performance at mid-market prices.

Gooseen - Aramid spoke wheels: at 1167g per set with spokes weighing just 2.2g each, these wheels prioritize comfort and vibration absorption. A unique woven fiber hub interface shows a fresh approach to engineering. Retail price? A premium $2500.

New groupset brands with a global intent

Ltwoo (L2): moving from shadows to spotlight with fully electronic TT group sets, cross-compatible components, and a new 14-speed internally geared hub. The real kicker? Electronic groups at $600 — ready to challenge Shimano and SRAM.

S Ride Sensar Ignite: affordable, production-ready groups seen on entry-level bikes. Sensar is positioning itself as “the bike for the people.” 

OEM mixed carbon brands: cranks, disc rotor spiders, pulley cages, ... multiple minor brands are ready to go direct selling their full in-house production.

Complete bikes: price meets performance

Camp Bicycles is a new Chinese brand with racing DNA. They featured the Ace DA (Shimano Di2, aero frame, 7.3kg) priced at just $3,515 as premium frameset,  as well as a full mid-range bikes collection coming at prices Western brands can’t dream of matching. All without sacrificing style or technical specifications.

Flying Pigeon: with a stunning figure of 500 million bikes produced since 1950, they are China’s living bike heritage. Now updating with modern group sets for the domestic market.

Dragon: a feast for the eyes — or a triumph of excess — this comapny showed up with bikes dipped in gold, weighing 7.7kg and priced up to $4,600. More about bling than performance, yet worth mentioning for the record, as they undeniably turned heads.

Manufacturing, Reinvented

3D printing was everywhere! From saddles and grips to experimental lattice-structured frames. One standout? A Zinda 3D saddle, carbon-railed and just 185g — priced at only $25. This is cost-disruptive innovation, available today.

Context is king: why Shanghai matters more than ever

The Shanghai Bicycle Show wasn’t just bigger than Taipei, it felt fundamentally more relevant. While legacy events like Taipei continue to echo the past, Shanghai clearly signals the future. Chinese brands aren’t simply displaying new products, they’re executing precise strategies, targeting specific markets, and deploying tools that integrate production with marketing and logistics in real time.

This isn't just a shift in geography, it's a shift in how the industry thinks. Taipei looked inward. Shanghai looked forward. But here's the real issue: even the most exciting products and well-positioned brands are still navigating a landscape riddled with inefficiencies. And that’s where the real opportunity lies. Let’s take a closer look.

The real takeaway: the industry is evolving but the infrastructure is not

What the Shanghai show ultimately exposed is a paradox: the bike industry is racing ahead in innovation, but crawling when it comes to digital transformation. Data is fragmented. OEM brands struggle to scale into DTC and the retail supply chain is in contrast with the direct to consumer policies... Western brands are weighed down by slow adaptation. Retailers lack consistent product information. Distributors can’t keep up with SKU proliferation. And physical trade shows, once the industry’s engine, are now misfiring. The industry currently doesn’t seem to need more wheels or derailleurs, but a shared infrastructure to organize this chaos.

EurekaBike is the infrastructure for the New Era of the bike industry

In this moment of transformation, EurekaBike is not just a marketplace or a PIM/DAM system. It is the missing layer of infrastructure the bike industry desperately needs. For Western brands, it streamlines product data across all channels, slashes operational waste, and boosts visibility through a single, integrated system. For rising Chinese brands, it becomes the gateway to the European market — offering structured onboarding, standardized data formats, and instant distribution tools. For OEMs and retailers, it connects products to people — cleanly, accurately, and scalably. Where others see chaos, EurekaBike creates clarity. Where others see fragmentation, EurekaBike builds bridges. Where others chase trends, EurekaBike enables seamless communication throughout a whole industry.

Who will seize the moment?

The 2025 Shanghai Bicycle Show marks a new chapter. Not just because of flashy bikes or lightweight components — but because it shows us who’s hungry, who’s ready, and who’s building for tomorrow. Taiwan, the old guard, is slowing down. China, the new force, is accelerating. But the real story is about who can connect innovation to markets in the fastest, most effective, and scalable way. EurekaBike is ready to support those who are ready to act — whether you're a legacy brand looking to stay relevant, or a rising star ready to scale globally. The industry’s future isn’t written in carbon. It’s written in data. And the next chapter starts now.

Jacopo Vigna

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05-04-2026 Read Read

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