Italian bike industry crisis: the retailers' perspective

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A special thanks to Marco Toniolo, founder of MTB Mag — Italy's leading mountain bike platform — for the outstanding work he did interviewing some of the most important retail operators in the sector: ScoutBike, Ridewill, All4Cycling and others. His article The bike market crisis as seen by retailers is a valuable document of first-hand accounts that rarely surface in industry analysis.

A market that cannot get back on its feet

This is no longer a temporary downturn — it is a structural condition. Three years after the post-pandemic peak, the Italian bicycle market closes 2025 in the red once again. ANCMA data presented in March 2026 leave no room for superficial optimism: total sales stop at 1,303,000 units, a 4% decline versus 2024. The number that truly stings is the one for the specialist retail channel — bike shops — where e-bikes are down 14% and pedal bikes down 8%.

What emerges from Toniolo's interviews with retailers is the qualitative confirmation of what the numbers already suggest: the problem is not just cyclical, it is systemic. And solutions are not coming from the industry.

Segment 2025 sales Change % vs 2024 Specialist retail channel
Traditional bikes 1,047,000 units −3% −8%
E-bikes 256,000 units −7% −14%
Total market 1,303,000 units −4% —
Traditional bike exports (value) €317 million +14.8% —

Source: Confindustria ANCMA, 2025 data presented March 2026

 

Stock and demand: the double-pressure trap

The retailers interviewed by Toniolo all tell the same story: too much stock, too little demand. ScoutBike describes a market kept afloat only by promotions on 2024-2025 models; Ridewill confirms that sales are happening mainly on discounted previous stock — decent response, but compressed margins.

It is a perfect snapshot of an industry that overproduced during the 2020-2022 boom and is now paying the price. Excess supply drives structural discounting, which erodes shop margins, which cuts investment, which degrades customer service. A vicious cycle confirmed by the financials of the major players: Giant Group closed the first half of 2024 with consolidated revenues down nearly 13%; Shimano had shed more than 20% in bicycle segment sales.

The average price of a traditional bike in Italy fell 33% between 2023 and 2024 (from roughly €587 to €391). E-bikes dropped 25% to an average of around €1,100. This is not healthy adjustment — it is forced deflation driven by excess stock, burning brand value and reputation in the process.

Too many products, too few buyers

All4Cycling puts its finger on the real issue with precision: it is not just a matter of prices, but of overproduction of product lines in a market that has shrunk. If 10 brands make the same thing and there are 8 people who can afford to buy it, 2 brands will not sell. The cycling industry replicated during the post-Covid boom the same mistake already seen in other consumer markets: it mistook extraordinary demand for the new normal, multiplied its model range, inflated price lists, and saturated distributor warehouses. The result is that the average shop today manages a product complexity that is completely out of proportion with actual customer footfall.

The average customer is ageing — and young people are not coming in

One of the most worrying signals to emerge from Toniolo's interviews is almost whispered, but its long-term implications are significant: the average cyclist is getting older. All4Cycling states this based on its own databases: the typical customer profile is increasingly older, and young people are simply not entering the funnel. In Italy the phenomenon is amplified by the lack of cycling infrastructure and a cycling culture that struggles to take root outside the 40-60 age bracket.

If today a 5-10% slice of customers with budgets above €10,000 is holding up the premium market, it means the replacement base is not forming. The bike has become "the new golf" — but without ever winning over the masses the way padel or running have.

The customer the industry has lost sight of

  • The 30-40 year-old newcomer walks into a shop, sees the prices, and walks back out.
  • The "health" customer (my doctor told me to start cycling) wants to spend €1,000 — a price point almost absent from premium catalogues.
  • Young people find no credible entry-level options in specialist retail.
  • A structured second-hand market does not exist: there is no reliable used-bike ecosystem to serve as a gateway into cycling.

Avinox vs Bosch: a battle the mass market has not yet understood

All4Cycling offers a clear-eyed analysis of the current technology duel: the Specialized Avinox motor is seen as the future by enthusiasts and industry insiders, but the average customer still walks into a shop asking for "the Bosch". The German brand remains the trusted benchmark for the non-expert consumer.

For retailers this has a practical cost: selling innovative but less familiar platforms requires more consultative selling, more time per sale, more staff training. In a context of compressed margins, that is an investment not every shop can afford.

Then there is the question of innovation speed. Chinese manufacturers refresh their models every 6-12 months; established European brands have a 3-year frame development cycle. The question the industry needs to answer is whether it is ready to accelerate — or whether the mid-range segment will gradually be eroded by Asian players whose costs and renewal pace are simply incomparable.

The niches that are holding up: accessories, services, road, downhill

Not everything is in crisis. The retailers interviewed by Toniolo clearly identify the segments that are still performing. Clothing, helmets and shoes remain the strongest summer drivers. In winter, indoor training (trainers, electronics) takes over. Road cycling is growing for some operators; downhill holds up well at shops with a strong specialisation identity and a recognisable athlete in the community.

The lesson for retailers is already written: vertical specialisation + service + community. The shops that are surviving are not the ones trying to sell everything to everyone, but those that own a niche, build a genuine relationship with their customers, and monetise through maintenance, motor servicing and suspension overhauls — not just new product sales.

A significant figure shared by All4Cycling: on a product launch managed with months of preparation and active customer consultation, 30% of the planned allocation sold out on day one. That is not luck — it is the result of a relationship built over time.

What will happen in 2026 — and what needs to change

The 2025 data indicate that 2026 will be another year of transition, not recovery. Inventory levels are high, demand is weak, and the specialist channel is under pressure. A network of over 4,000 specialist bike shops in Italy is in structural difficulty: many risk not making it to next season without a fundamental change in their business model.

Priority Rationale
Cut SKUs, not prices Discount-driven deflation merely pushes the problem forward. Range rationalisation is what is needed.
Accessible communication The industry talks to itself. The newcomer does not understand — and if they do not understand, they do not buy.
Support the specialist channel Bike shops are the most effective physical touchpoint for premium product. If they collapse, so does the culture around the product.
Build a structured used-bike market An organised second-hand ecosystem brings new users into cycling — it does not take sales away from new product.
Credible entry-level for young riders Lowering prices is not enough: the offer needs to be redesigned for customers spending €500-800 who want to be treated as real customers, not second-class visitors.

 

Conclusions

Marco Toniolo's interviews with Italian retailers have the merit of making clear what corporate press releases struggle to say: the problem is not the headwind — it is a boat that needs to change course. Overproduction, prices disconnected from the real market, self-referential communication, no generational renewal in sight.

The 2025 ANCMA data confirm all of it. The specialist retail channel is the one suffering most — and paradoxically the one that could do the most, if supported by an industry that stops waiting for the storm to pass and starts navigating.

At EurekaBike we will continue monitoring the numbers and the stories of those working every day to keep the sector alive. The bike is not just a product — it is an ecosystem. And ecosystems die when they consume themselves.

EurekaBike · April 2026 · Sources: Confindustria ANCMA 2025, MTB Mag, BDC Mag, 4ActionSport, GravelNews

Jacopo Vigna

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