While the industry describes itself as being in a downturn, Pon.Bike keeps revenues around €2 billion and remains profitable. Giant drops 15.5% in a year. Behind the numbers lie two diverging industrial philosophies — and an uncomfortable question for the B2B supply chain.
The two different contexts of Giant and Pon.Bike
The comparison between Giant Group and Pon.Bike is not a competition, but an analytical tool.
The reference data, processed by Elisa Chiu of Anchor Global, shows the revenue curves of the two groups from 2018 to 2025, with Pon data converted from EUR to TWD to make them comparable. The result is clear: the two curves intersect around 2023 and diverge from there. Giant declines. Pon holds.
The comparison is not symmetrical, and that is precisely the point. Giant is a pure industrial champion, while Pon.Bike is a capital-driven holding with a portfolio of brands, a subscription-based services component, and a European root in cargo and urban mobility. Comparing them does not mean declaring a winner, but understanding which levers build resilience in a structurally changing market.
Key data
- Giant Revenue 2025: NT$60.25 billion (~€1.7 billion)
- Giant YoY Change: −15.5%
- Giant Revenue peak 2022: NT$92.04 billion
- Decline from 2022 peak to 2025: −34.6%
- Pon.Bike Revenue 2025: ~€2.0 billion (estimate)
- Pon structural turning point: Dorel Sports acquisition, 2021
Giant: industrial power, cyclical exposure
Giant Group reached its all-time revenue peak in 2022 with NT$92 billion, driven by pandemic demand. From there, the decline was rapid: NT$77 billion in 2023, NT$71 billion in 2024, NT$60 billion in 2025.
In three years, the group lost more than 34% of its peak revenue.
The reasons are structural. Giant is deeply dependent on the US market through OEM, a channel that amplified post-COVID demand volatility. The business model remains product-centric — development cycles, manufacturing, wholesale — with a limited recurring revenue component capable of smoothing sell-through fluctuations.
This is not a weakness per se, and Giant’s manufacturing depth, vertical integration capabilities, and product innovation remain long-term strategic assets. But in the current cycle, that same industrial depth translates into fixed cost rigidity and direct exposure to demand contractions. It is simply the price of the model.
Pon.Bike: portfolio, services, opacity
Pon.Bike has followed a different trajectory.
Their turning point was the acquisition of Dorel Sports in 2021, which brought Cannondale, GT Bicycles, Schwinn, Mongoose and Caloi into the portfolio, transforming Pon into a true global house of brands. The stated goal at the time was a combined revenue of around €2.5 billion.
Alongside its brand portfolio, Pon built a Bike Mobility Services component (with Lease a Bike and BusinessBike), generating recurring revenues structurally decoupled from traditional sell-in volatility. Swapfiets further expands its presence in the demand-driven ecosystem, while Urban Arrow strengthens its position in the cargo segment.
As Patricia Ibanez Porcel (Bike and Hike Canada) observed:
“The real divergence is not just ‘industrial vs portfolio’. It is between product-centric and customer-lifecycle-centric models. Leasing and services reduce volatility because they tie revenue to the customer lifecycle, not to the sales cycle.”
The problem is that this resilience is difficult to measure precisely. Pon.Bike operates within Pon Holdings, a private group with significant automotive activities. There are no public segment reports that separate the profitability of the bike business from the rest of the group.
As Tommy Sherlock (The Bicycle Depot) points out:
“When we say Pon.Bike is profitable, the real question is: profitable on its own — or within a diversified group structure?
The question the B2B supply chain should ask
The comparison between Giant and Pon.Bike is a signal of where value drivers are concentrating within the industry.
The Pon model suggests that resilience is built by diversifying customer touchpoints: not just selling bikes, but supporting a usage lifecycle — leasing, maintenance, subscriptions, data and data-driven services.
The brands that will survive future cycles are those capable of monetizing beyond the single physical product transaction. This logic scales down across the supply chain. The advanced dealer is no longer just a point of sale, but becomes a service hub, fleet operator, and subscription manager.
What the future of capital geography tells us
Giant represents Taiwanese manufacturing excellence. Pon.Bike represents European capital aggregating brands and controlling urban demand. In the medium term, the defining variable will be the e-bike: components, software, data, and direct customer access.
Giant has production capabilities. Pon has service touchpoints. The moves made over the next 24 months will say a lot about who will lead the next phase of the industry.
Conclusion
The divergence between Giant and Pon.Bike is real and structural. The implications for the B2B supply chain are concrete. The next validation point will come from Pon.Bike’s segmented data, when available.
But the most relevant question remains another: how replicable is the customer-lifecycle model within the independent supply chain, outside large financial groups? The answer to this question is likely more valuable than the comparison between two major players.
Editorial note
Missing critical data: no public source precisely separates the contribution of leasing, Urban Arrow, and Swapfiets to Pon.Bike’s total revenue. When Dutch filings become available, this will be the key metric to monitor in order to validate or falsify the structural resilience thesis.
Credits and sources
- Data and chart: Elisa Chiu, Anchor Global (LinkedIn, April 2026)
- Comments: Tommy Sherlock, Patricia Ibanez Porcel, Jean-Sébastien Fabien, Bernd Hake