When the 2021 youth road cycling races begin

A special thanks to Marco Toniolo, founder of MTB Mag — Italy's leading mountain bike platform — for the outstanding work he did interviewing some of the most important retail operators in the sector: ScoutBike, Ridewill, All4Cycling and others. His article The bike market crisis as seen by retailers is a valuable document of first-hand accounts that rarely surface in industry analysis. A market that cannot get back on its feet This is no longer a temporary downturn — it is a structural condition. Three years after the post-pandemic peak, the Italian bicycle market closes 2025 in the red once again. ANCMA data presented in March 2026 leave no room for superficial optimism: total sales stop at 1,303,000 units, a 4% decline versus 2024. The number that truly stings is the one for the specialist retail channel — bike shops — where e-bikes are down 14% and pedal bikes down 8%. What emerges from Toniolo's interviews with retailers is the qualitative confirmation of what the numbers already suggest: the problem is not just cyclical, it is systemic. And solutions are not coming from the industry. Segment 2025 sales Change % vs 2024 Specialist retail channel Traditional bikes 1,047,000 units −3% −8% E-bikes 256,000 units −7% −14% Total market 1,303,000 units −4% — Traditional bike exports (value) €317 million +14.8% — Source: Confindustria ANCMA, 2025 data presented March 2026   Stock and demand: the double-pressure trap The retailers interviewed by Toniolo all tell the same story: too much stock, too little demand. ScoutBike describes a market kept afloat only by promotions on 2024-2025 models; Ridewill confirms that sales are happening mainly on discounted previous stock — decent response, but compressed margins. It is a perfect snapshot of an industry that overproduced during the 2020-2022 boom and is now paying the price. Excess supply drives structural discounting, which erodes shop margins, which cuts investment, which degrades customer service. A vicious cycle confirmed by the financials of the major players: Giant Group closed the first half of 2024 with consolidated revenues down nearly 13%; Shimano had shed more than 20% in bicycle segment sales. The average price of a traditional bike in Italy fell 33% between 2023 and 2024 (from roughly €587 to €391). E-bikes dropped 25% to an average of around €1,100. This is not healthy adjustment — it is forced deflation driven by excess stock, burning brand value and reputation in the process. Too many products, too few buyers All4Cycling puts its finger on the real issue with precision: it is not just a matter of prices, but of overproduction of product lines in a market that has shrunk. If 10 brands make the same thing and there are 8 people who can afford to buy it, 2 brands will not sell. The cycling industry replicated during the post-Covid boom the same mistake already seen in other consumer markets: it mistook extraordinary demand for the new normal, multiplied its model range, inflated price lists, and saturated distributor warehouses. The result is that the average shop today manages a product complexity that is completely out of proportion with actual customer footfall. The average customer is ageing — and young people are not coming in One of the most worrying signals to emerge from Toniolo's interviews is almost whispered, but its long-term implications are significant: the average cyclist is getting older. All4Cycling states this based on its own databases: the typical customer profile is increasingly older, and young people are simply not entering the funnel. In Italy the phenomenon is amplified by the lack of cycling infrastructure and a cycling culture that struggles to take root outside the 40-60 age bracket. If today a 5-10% slice of customers with budgets above €10,000 is holding up the premium market, it means the replacement base is not forming. The bike has become "the new golf" — but without ever winning over the masses the way padel or running have. The customer the industry has lost sight of The 30-40 year-old newcomer walks into a shop, sees the prices, and walks back out. The "health" customer (my doctor told me to start cycling) wants to spend €1,000 — a price point almost absent from premium catalogues. Young people find no credible entry-level options in specialist retail. A structured second-hand market does not exist: there is no reliable used-bike ecosystem to serve as a gateway into cycling. Avinox vs Bosch: a battle the mass market has not yet understood All4Cycling offers a clear-eyed analysis of the current technology duel: the Specialized Avinox motor is seen as the future by enthusiasts and industry insiders, but the average customer still walks into a shop asking for "the Bosch". The German brand remains the trusted benchmark for the non-expert consumer. For retailers this has a practical cost: selling innovative but less familiar platforms requires more consultative selling, more time per sale, more staff training. In a context of compressed margins, that is an investment not every shop can afford. Then there is the question of innovation speed. Chinese manufacturers refresh their models every 6-12 months; established European brands have a 3-year frame development cycle. The question the industry needs to answer is whether it is ready to accelerate — or whether the mid-range segment will gradually be eroded by Asian players whose costs and renewal pace are simply incomparable. The niches that are holding up: accessories, services, road, downhill Not everything is in crisis. The retailers interviewed by Toniolo clearly identify the segments that are still performing. Clothing, helmets and shoes remain the strongest summer drivers. In winter, indoor training (trainers, electronics) takes over. Road cycling is growing for some operators; downhill holds up well at shops with a strong specialisation identity and a recognisable athlete in the community. The lesson for retailers is already written: vertical specialisation + service + community. The shops that are surviving are not the ones trying to sell everything to everyone, but those that own a niche, build a genuine relationship with their customers, and monetise through maintenance, motor servicing and suspension overhauls — not just new product sales. A significant figure shared by All4Cycling: on a product launch managed with months of preparation and active customer consultation, 30% of the planned allocation sold out on day one. That is not luck — it is the result of a relationship built over time. What will happen in 2026 — and what needs to change The 2025 data indicate that 2026 will be another year of transition, not recovery. Inventory levels are high, demand is weak, and the specialist channel is under pressure. A network of over 4,000 specialist bike shops in Italy is in structural difficulty: many risk not making it to next season without a fundamental change in their business model. Priority Rationale Cut SKUs, not prices Discount-driven deflation merely pushes the problem forward. Range rationalisation is what is needed. Accessible communication The industry talks to itself. The newcomer does not understand — and if they do not understand, they do not buy. Support the specialist channel Bike shops are the most effective physical touchpoint for premium product. If they collapse, so does the culture around the product. Build a structured used-bike market An organised second-hand ecosystem brings new users into cycling — it does not take sales away from new product. Credible entry-level for young riders Lowering prices is not enough: the offer needs to be redesigned for customers spending €500-800 who want to be treated as real customers, not second-class visitors.   Conclusions Marco Toniolo's interviews with Italian retailers have the merit of making clear what corporate press releases struggle to say: the problem is not the headwind — it is a boat that needs to change course. Overproduction, prices disconnected from the real market, self-referential communication, no generational renewal in sight. The 2025 ANCMA data confirm all of it. The specialist retail channel is the one suffering most — and paradoxically the one that could do the most, if supported by an industry that stops waiting for the storm to pass and starts navigating. At EurekaBike we will continue monitoring the numbers and the stories of those working every day to keep the sector alive. The bike is not just a product — it is an ecosystem. And ecosystems die when they consume themselves. EurekaBike · April 2026 · Sources: Confindustria ANCMA 2025, MTB Mag, BDC Mag, 4ActionSport, GravelNews

While the industry describes itself as being in a downturn, Pon.Bike keeps revenues around €2 billion and remains profitable. Giant drops 15.5% in a year. Behind the numbers lie two diverging industrial philosophies — and an uncomfortable question for the B2B supply chain. The two different contexts of Giant and Pon.Bike  The comparison between Giant Group and Pon.Bike is not a competition, but an analytical tool. The reference data, processed by Elisa Chiu of Anchor Global, shows the revenue curves of the two groups from 2018 to 2025, with Pon data converted from EUR to TWD to make them comparable. The result is clear: the two curves intersect around 2023 and diverge from there. Giant declines. Pon holds. The comparison is not symmetrical, and that is precisely the point. Giant is a pure industrial champion, while Pon.Bike is a capital-driven holding with a portfolio of brands, a subscription-based services component, and a European root in cargo and urban mobility. Comparing them does not mean declaring a winner, but understanding which levers build resilience in a structurally changing market. Key data Giant Revenue 2025: NT$60.25 billion (~€1.7 billion) Giant YoY Change: −15.5% Giant Revenue peak 2022: NT$92.04 billion Decline from 2022 peak to 2025: −34.6% Pon.Bike Revenue 2025: ~€2.0 billion (estimate) Pon structural turning point: Dorel Sports acquisition, 2021 Giant: industrial power, cyclical exposure Giant Group reached its all-time revenue peak in 2022 with NT$92 billion, driven by pandemic demand. From there, the decline was rapid: NT$77 billion in 2023, NT$71 billion in 2024, NT$60 billion in 2025. In three years, the group lost more than 34% of its peak revenue. The reasons are structural. Giant is deeply dependent on the US market through OEM, a channel that amplified post-COVID demand volatility. The business model remains product-centric — development cycles, manufacturing, wholesale — with a limited recurring revenue component capable of smoothing sell-through fluctuations. This is not a weakness per se, and Giant’s manufacturing depth, vertical integration capabilities, and product innovation remain long-term strategic assets. But in the current cycle, that same industrial depth translates into fixed cost rigidity and direct exposure to demand contractions. It is simply the price of the model. Pon.Bike: portfolio, services, opacity Pon.Bike has followed a different trajectory. Their turning point was the acquisition of Dorel Sports in 2021, which brought Cannondale, GT Bicycles, Schwinn, Mongoose and Caloi into the portfolio, transforming Pon into a true global house of brands. The stated goal at the time was a combined revenue of around €2.5 billion. Alongside its brand portfolio, Pon built a Bike Mobility Services component (with Lease a Bike and BusinessBike), generating recurring revenues structurally decoupled from traditional sell-in volatility. Swapfiets further expands its presence in the demand-driven ecosystem, while Urban Arrow strengthens its position in the cargo segment. As Patricia Ibanez Porcel (Bike and Hike Canada) observed: “The real divergence is not just ‘industrial vs portfolio’. It is between product-centric and customer-lifecycle-centric models. Leasing and services reduce volatility because they tie revenue to the customer lifecycle, not to the sales cycle.” The problem is that this resilience is difficult to measure precisely. Pon.Bike operates within Pon Holdings, a private group with significant automotive activities. There are no public segment reports that separate the profitability of the bike business from the rest of the group. As Tommy Sherlock (The Bicycle Depot) points out: “When we say Pon.Bike is profitable, the real question is: profitable on its own — or within a diversified group structure? The question the B2B supply chain should ask The comparison between Giant and Pon.Bike is a signal of where value drivers are concentrating within the industry. The Pon model suggests that resilience is built by diversifying customer touchpoints: not just selling bikes, but supporting a usage lifecycle — leasing, maintenance, subscriptions, data and data-driven services. The brands that will survive future cycles are those capable of monetizing beyond the single physical product transaction. This logic scales down across the supply chain. The advanced dealer is no longer just a point of sale, but becomes a service hub, fleet operator, and subscription manager. What the future of capital geography tells us Giant represents Taiwanese manufacturing excellence. Pon.Bike represents European capital aggregating brands and controlling urban demand. In the medium term, the defining variable will be the e-bike: components, software, data, and direct customer access. Giant has production capabilities. Pon has service touchpoints. The moves made over the next 24 months will say a lot about who will lead the next phase of the industry. Conclusion The divergence between Giant and Pon.Bike is real and structural. The implications for the B2B supply chain are concrete. The next validation point will come from Pon.Bike’s segmented data, when available. But the most relevant question remains another: how replicable is the customer-lifecycle model within the independent supply chain, outside large financial groups? The answer to this question is likely more valuable than the comparison between two major players. Editorial note Missing critical data: no public source precisely separates the contribution of leasing, Urban Arrow, and Swapfiets to Pon.Bike’s total revenue. When Dutch filings become available, this will be the key metric to monitor in order to validate or falsify the structural resilience thesis. Credits and sources Data and chart: Elisa Chiu, Anchor Global (LinkedIn, April 2026) Comments: Tommy Sherlock, Patricia Ibanez Porcel, Jean-Sébastien Fabien, Bernd Hake